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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
is of paramount importance to low-income groups. 20 The decision
in Hill v. Hill is, therefore, consistent with a growing trend toward
the extension of full faith and credit to modifiable decrees, 27 and to
analogous situations in the law28 in accordance with sound public
policy.29
Francis Lucas Warder, Jr.
Income Tax - Tax Status of Employer
Financed Scholarships
Messrs. Johnson, Pomerantz, and Wolfe, employees of Westing-
house, were granted leave of absence for the purpose of research-
ing and writing their doctoral theses. Mr. Johnson, as typical of the
three plaintiffs, was granted leave from October 1, 1960 through
June 30, 1961, and during this period he pursued the educational
undertaking on a full time basis. Westinghouse paid him $5,670.00
which represented 80% of his normal salary for the period. In-
come taxes were withhold and Westinghouse treated the ex-
penditures as indirect labor expenses on their records. The sub-
ject of the thesis had to relate at least generally to the employer's
business. Employee benefits were continued and the employees
were obligated to return to Westinghouse for a specified period at
the end of the study leave. Claims for a refund were filed on the
basis that the amounts received were schelarships or fellowship
grants and excludible from income under section 117 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954.1 The Supreme Court, in reversing
Barber v. Barber, 323 US. 77 (1944), See, e.g., Worthley v. Worthley, 44
Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955); Grossman v. Grossman, 242 SCG. 298, 130 SE.2d
850 (1963).
'Scoles, supra note 4, at 820; New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S.
610 (1947) (child custody); People ex rel. Bukovich v. Bukovich, 39 II.2d 76, 233
N.E.2d 382 (1968) (child custody).
2"See Scoles, supra note 4, at 817.
'Section 117.
(a) General Rule. In the case of an individual, gross income does not
include-
(1) any amount received-
(A) as a scholorship at an educational institution (as defined in
section 151 (e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant, including the value of contributed sr-
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the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2 held that the payments
made to the taxpayers were compensation and not excludible as a
scholarships or fellowship grants. Payments made primarily for
the benefit of the grantor are not to be considered an amount
received as a scholarship or fellowship grant. Bingler v. Johnson,
394 U.S. 741 (1969).
Section 117 was enacted as a part of the Internal Revenue Code
of 19543 and had no counterpart under the 1939 Code. Prior to the
enactment of section 117, scholarships and fellowship grants were
taxable unless it could be shown that they were gifts, made to
enable the recipient to acquire a degree or further his educational
development.4 Section 117 was enacted primarily to resolve the
problem of whether the scholarships or fellowship grant was a
gift or taxable income.5 The number of rulings and cases6 arising
under the section indicates that the desires of Congress, in achieving
greater certainty as to the taxability of schorlarships and fellow-
vices and accomodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for-
(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but only
to the extent that the amount is expended by the recipient.2Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1968). The district court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania, in a trial by jury, had held that the
grants were taxable compensation. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed, declaring that the regulations relied on in the district court were
invalid.
68A State (1954).4 See, e.g., George Winchester Stone, Jr., 23 T.C. 254, 261 (1954). "The
issue is whether the amount received . . . is taxable income . . . or a gift.
We have found that the fellowship payment to the petitioner was a giftl'
See H. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954):
Your committee's bill sets forth rules for determining the extent to
which scholarships and fellowship grants are to be included in gross in-
come and eliminates the existing confusion as to whether such payments
are to be treated as income or as gifts. The present statute and regulations
do not cover these grants. The basic ruling of the Internal Revenue Service
which states that the amount of a grant or a fellowship is includible in
gross income unless it can be established to be a gift provides no clear-
cut method of distinguishing between taxable and nontaxable grants.
Hence, the tax status of these grants must be decided on a case by case
method.
'Lawrence E. Bronowitz, 27 CCI Tax Ct. Mem. 1088 (1968) (taxpayer
required to work part-time but paid separately for this and not obligated to
work for the grantor upon receiving degree; exclusion allowed); Pappas v. United
States, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9386 (E. D. Ark. 1967) (primary purpose of the grant
1970]
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ship grants, has not been realized. The old rule required the
determination of excludibility to be on a case by case basis. The
effect of the new rule seems to have been much the same.
A number of cases under section 117 have been decided by
determining the primary purpose of the grant. Exclusion has been
allowed where the primary purpose of the grant was for the further-
ance of the taxpayer's education and training7 but denied where the
grant was primarily for the benefit of the grantor s Authority for
basing the excludibility of a grant on the primary purpose for
which it was made is contained in the regulations. 9 This formula-
tion is commonly referred to as the "primary purpose test" and was
solely relied on for determining the excludibility of the grant in
was furthering the taxpayer's education and training in an individual capacity;
exclusion allowed even though the grantor may receive incidental benefits);
Chandler P. Bhalla, 35 T.C. 13, (1960) (primary purpose of the grant was fur-
therance of taxpayer's training; exclusion allowed); Frank Thomas Bachmura, 32
T.C. 1117 (1959) (payment not for the advancement of the education and
knowledge of the recipient personally; exclusion not allowed).
E.g., Rev. Rul. 76, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 56 (American Heart Association
grants excludible); Rev. Rul. 419, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 46 (American Cancer Soc-
iety grants excludible); Rev. Rul. 419, 1956-2 Cuss. BULL. 112 (benefits to grantee
excludible, notwithstanding that the grantor may derive some benefit from the
taxpayer's research and dissertation); Rev. Rul. 191, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 40
(corporate grant to employee excludible where employee was not obligated
to render future services to the donor); Rev. Rul. 58, 1961-1 GuM. BuL. 37
(business firm prize not excludible); Rev. Rul. 241, 1966-2 Curs. BULL. 40 (faculty
assistance grant excludible); Rev. Rul. 81, 1959-1 Curr. BULL. 37 (foreign study
grant excludible) p Rev. Rul. 101, 1916-1 Cus. BuLL. 89 (hospital trainee grant
not excludible). These are but a few of the several rulings. The question of ex-
cludibility is so often raised that the Internal Revenue Service has issued
detailed special instructions to taxpayers receiving amounts for study or research.
See Rev. Proc. 68-11, 1968-1 Cuim. BuLL. 761.
'Pappas v. United States, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9386 (ElD. Ark. 1967);
Chandler P. Bhalla, 3 T.C. 13 (1960).
'Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); Ussery v. United
States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961).
'See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (2) (1956).
Items not considered as scholarships or fellowship grants.
(C) .... Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily
or the benefit of the grantor.
(2) .... Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual
to enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the
gri4ntor.
However, amounts paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual
to enable him to pursue studies or research are considered to be amounts
received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose of section 117
if the primary purpose of the studies or research is to further the educa-
tion and training of the recipient in his individual capacity and the a-
mount provided by the grantor for such purpose does not represent com-
pensation or payment for services.... (emphasis added).
[Vol. 72
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Reiffen v. United States,'o and applied reluctantly in Reese v. Com-
missioner." However, the courts have experienced great difficulty
in determining the primary purpose of the grant.12 This same test
was provided in Treasury Regulation 1.162-5 to determine the
deductibility of education expenses under section 162. Owing to
the difficulty encountered by the courts in applying the "pri-
mary purpose test" to education expenses, the regulations were
amended and the "primary purpose test, was eliminated.13 The pro-
blem was with regard to the interpretation to be given the key words
"primary purpose"'1 and this same problem is encountered by the
courts under section 117.15
The decision of the Third Circuit was a more liberal treat-
ment of employer-paid scholarships than the Commissioner's regula-
tions permitted. The Third Circuit was of the opinion that Trea-
sury Regulation 1.117-4 (c) - was contrary to the intent of the
Congress that enacted the Code; therefore, the court held the
regulation was invalid. However, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit had previously held that the regulation governed in
"0 376 F.2d 883 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
u37a F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967).
' Stewart v. United States, 86a F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966).
)3 T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cur. BuLL. 86. Is the primary purpose test now used
to determine excludibility under section 117 anything more than the pre-1954
gift or compensation test in disguise?
""See, e.g., Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958). The court
found that the taxpayer's long range objective was to become a permanent
member of the university teaching staff, for which position the possession of a
doctoral degree was required. The pursuit of the doctoral degree was found
to have dual objectives: (1) to retain hii present appointment (which was
temporary), and (2) to qualify for the permanent teaching staff (which would
be a new position). The court determined that the expenses incurred by Mr.
Marlor in pursuit of his doctorate were deductible.
"See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355, 857 (6th Cir. 1966):
We believe, however, that consideration of the facts as indicia of
compensation for services is a more meaningful test than that of whether
the stipend was primarily for the benefit of the grantors. Obviously, in
all instances where the employment relationship - past or future - is
involved, there is at least some mutuality of benefit....
" n pertinent part, Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) (1956) provides as follows:
The following payments or allowances shall not be considered to be
amounts received as a scholarship or a fellowship grant for the purpose of
section 117: ...
(C) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for
the benefit of the grantor.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a) of § 1.117-2, any amount paid
or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies
or research if such amounts represents either compensation for past, present,
or future employment services or represents payment for services which are
subject to the direction or supervision of the grantor.
1970]
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determining the taxability of educational grants. 17 Decisions in the
Fourth Circuit,'8 Sixth Circuit,19 Tenth Circuit,2° and the Court
of Claims2 were generally in accord with the decision in the Fifth
Circuit.
In reversing the Third Circuit's decision in Bingler the
Supreme Court noted: (1) the employer-employee relationship, (2)
a close relationship between the amounts paid to the employee while
on educational leave and his prior salaries, (3) continuation of
employee benefits, (4) the requirement that the thesis topic had to
relate, at least generally, to the work of the employer, and (5) that
the employee was obligated to return to Westinghouse for a sub-
stantial period following completion of his studies. Thus, the Court
clearly indicated that it felt the grant had the normal characteristics
of compensation and was not a scholarship or fellowship. Further-
more, the Court stated that the definition of scholarship and fel-
(2) Any amount paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to
enable him to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the
grantor. However, amounts paid or allowed to, or on behalf of, an indivi-
dual to enable him to pursue studies or research are considered to be
amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the purpose of
section 117 if the primary purpose of the studies or research is to further
the education and training of the recipient in his individual capacity and
the amount provided by the grantor for such purpose does not represent
compensation or payment for the services described in subparagraph (1) of
this paragraph ....
I Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961). The State Public
Welfare Department paid an employee while on educational leave. Taxpayer
was required to work one year following his leave or repay the grant. The court
found that the grant was primarily for the benefit of the employer. Exclusion
was denied.
"
8 Reese v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967). Taxpayer was
serving an internship as a student teacher and was paid by the local Board of
Education. Taxpayer took the place of a regular teacher in the school system.
Exclusion was denied.
"Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966). Employer received
progress reports from the educational institution. Taxpayer was employed both
before and after the educational leave by the payor of the grant. Exclusion was
denied.
'-Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F,2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963). Veterans Ad-
ministration hospital paid employee, a physician, his full pay while a portion of
his time was devoted to training purposes. The court found that the training
was primarily for the benefit of the Veterans Administration. Exclusion was
denied.
'Reiffen v. United States, 376 F.2d 883 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Electrical engineer
was to resume his employment with the grantor after completion of the
training. Exclusion was denied.
[Vol. 72
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lowship grant supplied by the regulations22 are "prima facia pro-
per, comporting as they do with the ordinary understanding of
'scholarships' and 'fellowships' as relative disinterested 'no strings'
educational grants, with no requirement of any substantial quid
pro quo from the recipients." 23
In the future, an employer financed education program for
advanced study by an employee, where the employee is required or
expected to return to work following the completion of the educa-
tion is going to be difficult to qualify for exclusion. However, it is
certain that there will be extensive litigation to determine the
exciudibility of employer financed scholarships and fellowship
grants in situations where the employer does not exercise as much
control as was present in Bingler v. Johnson. Furthermore, the
validity of the regulations under section 117, with all their short-
comings, has been determined.
Henry E. Riffe
'Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (1956).
(a) Scholarship. A scholarship generally means an amount paid
or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether an undergraduate or
a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his studies. The term
includes the value of contributed services and accomodations . . .and the
amount of tuition, marticulation, and other fees which are furnished or
remitted to a student to aid him in pursuing his studies. The term also
includes any amount received in the nature of a family allowance as a part
of a scholarship. However, the term does not include any amount provided
by an individual to aid a relative, friend, or other individual in pursuing his
studies where the grantor is motivated by family or philanthropic considera-
tions. If an educational institution maintains or participates in a plan
whereby the tuition of a child of a faculty member of such institution is
remitted by any other participating educational institution attended by
such child, the amount of the tuition so remitted shall be considered to
be an amount received as a scholarship.
(c) .... Fellowship grant. A fellowship grant generally means an a-
mount paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in
the pursuit of study or research. The term includes the value of contri-
buted services and accomodations .. . and the amount of tuition, marti-
culation, and other fees which are furnished or remitted to an individual
to aid him in the pursuit of study or research. The term also includes any
amount received in the nature of a family allowance as a part of the fellowship
grant. However, the term does not include any amount provided by an
individual to aid a relative, friend, or other individual in the pursuit of
study or research where the grantor is motivated by family or philanthropic
considerations.
'Bingler v. Johnson, 594 U.S. 741, 751 (1969).
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